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Abstract 
 
The expansion of online social media (OSM) and networked information 
technology (NIT) use has coincided with reinvigorated democratic 
movements around the world, including the toppling of authoritarian 
governments in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011.  This paper examines the 
variety of uses for Twitter during the Egyptian revolution, as Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime collapsed in less than three weeks after 30 years in 
power.   
 
 To achieve this analysis, this paper first divided the revolution into 
Fisk’s four stages of political crisis.  Next, the authors extracted 37,634 
tweets containing key words from an archive of 16 million tweets 
collected from January 23-February 8, 2011.  It then identified 14 
categories of tweets (including Call to Action, Information Sharing, 
Expression of Support, and Opinion) by manually annotating a randomly 
selected sample of nearly 6,000 sent during the uprising.  This manual 
annotation allowed the authors to develop category-specific patterns.  
After entering these patterns into a Java program, the authors ran an 
Automatic Content Analysis that tallied the number of tweets in each 
category per stage of political crisis.  By correlating the Content Analysis 
results with the known chronology of the revolution, the results provide 
the answers to several questions regarding the use of Twitter during the 
political crisis.   
 
 Throughout the revolution, Twitter was primarily used as an 
information-sharing tool, distributing news, updates, and critical 
information to protesters.  As the crisis progressed, however the uses of 
Twitter adapted to various government policies and developments in the 
uprising.  This examination of Twitter use can also serve as a stepping 
stone for other political or information scientists interested in studying the 
networked public sphere (NPS) and how the use of technology affects 
political movements. 
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Introduction 
 
Since December 17, 2010, the world has closely followed the series of 
uprisings in countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
collectively known, and popularly described, as the Arab Spring.  
Persistent demonstrations ousted two of the region’s most established 
authoritarian leaders, Tunisia’s Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s 
Hosni Mubarak, in under two months, laying the foundations for 
democratic reform.  Though the international media has consistently 
praised the critical role played by networked information technologies 
(NITs) including the Internet, mobile phones, and online social media 
(OSM) in the organization of the protests, there is little quantitative 
evidence to support these claims.  Due to the relative youth of NITs, few 
studies have empirically examined the effectiveness of NITs as 
mobilization or information-sharing tools, especially during this particular 
political crisis.  The 18-day revolution in Egypt provides an ideal 
opportunity to corroborate the alleged role of Twitter in the Arab Spring as 
well as to enhance our understanding of the functions and nature of the 
networked public sphere (NPS), an emerging public forum “composed of 
a seamless web of analog and digital, wired and wireless technologies” 
 6 
that together create a platform for discussion and information-sharing 
(Han, 2012). 
 This paper analyzes how the various uses of Twitter contributed to 
the unprecedented mobilization of protesters and the collapse of 
Mubarak’s authoritarian regime.  It does this by first applying Fisk’s 
theory of the four stages of political crisis (Prodrome, Outbreak, Chronic, 
and Resolution)1 as a framework for the Egyptian uprising.  To examine 
the role of Twitter in each of these stages, this paper downloaded and 
analyzed the content of 37,613 relevant tweets collected from January 23 
to February 8, 2011, from the NIST’s Tweets2011 archive.  By manually 
annotating a randomly-collected sample of 5,312 tweets, twelve categories 
of Twitter use were identified.  Based on these categories, an Automatic 
Content Analysis program was developed to account for how the Twitter-
created NPS was used in the revolution.  This paper expects the results of 
the Automatic Content Analysis to answer the following questions: 
 
 1) What kinds of roles did Twitter play in the collapse of 
 Mubarak’s regime in  Egypt? 
 
 2) What kinds of information were shared over the Twitter-created 
 NPS during the Egyptian political crisis? 
                                                 
1 Han (2009, 2011) applied Fisk’s theory of four stages in political crises 
into his analysis on how Korea’s youth attempted to impeach President 
Lee’s decision to resume the importation of American beef, which was 
known for “mad cow disease” in the NIT-created NPS 
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 3) What kinds of actions were called for over the Twitter-created 
 NPS? 
 
 4) Was the Egyptian government’s implementation of a total 
 Internet blackout an effective policy?  How did Twitter users adapt 
 to the policy? 
 
 5) How did demonstration effects from the Tunisian revolution 
 affect Twitter use in the Egyptian case, given the movements’ 
 geographic and temporal proximities?  How could the use of 
 Twitter influence the Arab Spring in other countries? 
 
 6) Is the Twitter-created NPS inherently interactive or one-sided in 
 nature? 
 
This paper finds that Twitter served as a diverse and interactive tool for 
communication, facilitating the expression of general information, critical 
information for and actual calls to action, and opinions.  Furthermore, this 
study provides significant insight as to how Twitter can affect politics in 
authoritarian regimes where pro-democracy movements are likely to occur 
in the near future.  More generally, due to the unprecedented amounts of 
data created daily by OSM, studies on the use of Twitter and other OSM 
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in political contexts will require the combined expertise of social and 
information scientists.  The analyses and conclusions provided in this 
paper are meant to be a step toward a deeper understanding of the Twitter-
created NPS and our understanding of its political implications.  
 
Young Generations and Life Politics in Egypt 
A factor commonly cited in the success of the Arab Spring was the 
primary role of youths in the initial series of critical demonstrations that 
led to the collapse of the regime in Egypt.  Mervat Madkour, a professor at 
Cairo University, explained that the crowds in Tahrir Square, the epicenter 
of the protests, were made largely of young Egyptians who organized 
themselves online (Madkour, 4/15/2012).  These protests were initially 
called for on Facebook, marking January 25, the National Police holiday, 
as the date of anti-government demonstrations.  Yet many Egyptians were 
uncertain of the seriousness and legitimacy of the protests. Fathya 
Eldakhakhny, a journalist in Egypt during the revolution, has stated that if 
no one had participated on the first day of planned protests, then the 
movement would likely have amounted to nothing (Eldakhakhny 
4/15/2012).  Yet these fears were proven to be unfounded when thousands 
of young Egyptians poured into the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other 
major cities.  Once the movement gained momentum, other Egyptians, 
most notably the poor and disadvantaged who were not technologically 
literate, saw an opportunity to create change in their society.  Essentially, 
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the protests began in the NPS and took on a life of their own once they 
were actualized in the streets.  
 But how critical were the young generations’ contributions and 
why did the movement succeed?  Previous generations had attempted to 
enact democratic and political reform, yet were unsuccessful.  This 
uprising was unique in both in its rapidity and its leaderless nature.  This 
paper finds that the use of NITs, specifically Twitter, was a major element 
in both of these unique factors, by facilitating the spreading of information 
and the mobilization of protesters.  It focuses on two key factors that 
contextualize the role of Twitter during the revolution, highlighting how 
their interactions brought on the political crisis.  These factors are the 
emergence of: 
 
 1) A large, technologically-savvy young generation in Arab 
 societies, and 
 
 2) Life politics as a new motivation of social and political actions 
 among this young generations. 
 
In 2011, 61% of Egypt’s 82 million people were under age 40, with the 
country’s median age at 24.3 years old, according to the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s International Database (See Table 1 on page 11).  This large 
percentage of the population had known no other leader than Mubarak, 
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and was growing dissatisfied with Egypt under his repressive regime.  
Historically, Egyptian presidents Nasser and Sadat had both led the 
country with dynamic national visions.  Under Mubarak, as Tarek Osman 
states, “the new generation never fought (or witnessed) a war; never lived 
with a national project; [or] grew up at a time in which the country was 
undergoing a surgical transformation” (Osman, 2010: 203).  Mubarak 
emphasized national security and economic liberalization policies upon 
entering the office in 1981, but his harsh repression of dissent and other 
political tactics were not legitimized by a unifying national vision that had 
permitted his predecessors to take similarly repressive actions. 
 The failure of Mubarak’s security-based strategy was not 
necessarily reflective of his policy, but rather of the shift in political 
motivations from emancipatory politics to life politics (Giddens 1991, Han 
2011).  Throughout Egypt’s history, emancipatory politics dominated the 
political landscape, through such movements as drives for independence 
and nationalist ideals.  Under Nasser, for example, major political dissent 
disappeared for the sake of national unity, progress, and independence 
from Great Britain.  Most Egyptians accepted this intrusion of liberty as 
long as it clearly served the goals of the state in the early phase of nation 
building.  Emancipatory politics were driven by powerful individuals 
whose personal lives mirrored the nation’s struggles and served as an 
inspiration to the society.  Today, however, while political ideologies and 
charismatic figures are still relevant and influential, the driving force 
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behind modern political movements has changed to life politics, the set of 
issues that directly disrupt the life of an individual or that individual’s 
network of acquaintances (Han 2011).  Contemporary political movements 
founded in life politics can include complaints over issues of corruption, 
socioeconomic deterioration, and a lack of freedoms, among others. 
 In Egypt, ordinary citizens suffered as a result of an unequal or 
underperforming economy and social issues affecting individuals in their 
lives.  Table 1 shows Egypt’s performance in a number of categories 
relating to life politics:  
 
 
Table 1 – Life Politics Indicators in Egypt 
 
Median 
Age 
GDP Per 
Capita PPP 
(2010) 
Youth 
Unemployment 
(2007) 
Inflation 
(2010) 
Youth 
Literacy Rate 
(2005-10) 
Corruption 
Score 
(2011) 
 
24.3 
 
 
$6,200 
 
24.8% 
 
11.10% 
82% (Female) 
88% (Male) 
 
3.8 
 
Data sources: CIA World Factbook, UNICEF, Transparency International 
 
 
The first indicator is GDP per capita (with purchasing power parity).  In 
2010, Egypt ranked 137th out of 227 countries and territories as calculated 
by the Central Intelligence Agency.  Having had the authority to 
implement an effective policy for economic liberalization since 1981, 
Mubarak failed to improve Egypt’s economy in a substantially beneficial 
way.  Though the economy was improving overall, many citizens felt 
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alienated because they did not personally experience the benefits of this 
improvement.  
 A second indicator is unemployment among youths age 15-24.  
Unemployment is perhaps the most obvious of life politics indicators, 
given that it provides individuals with an income and ability to perform a 
duty and support a family.  The rate of 24.8% is very high, especially 
considering that the overall unemployment rate is 9%.  That the rate is 
higher among youths is not unusual, yet with nearly one quarter of Egypt’s 
young people unemployed, frustration over this fundamental life politics 
issue was certain to decrease satisfaction with Mubarak’s economic 
policy. 
 Additionally, it must be noted that inflation was one of the most 
influential factors in the Egyptian uprising was inflation.  According to the 
CIA, Egypt had an inflation rate in 2010 of 11.10%, and was ranked 205th 
out of 222 countries and territories.  The rising cost of food and other 
goods further complicated and disoriented those who were unemployed.   
 A higher literacy rate has traditionally been considered an asset to 
economic development and an improvement in a country’s life politics 
conditions, but in Egypt, as the increased literacy rate among the young 
generation actually worsened the impending crisis.  Though a gender gap 
exists in Egyptian education, the age gap is much more notable.  The 
overall literacy rate in Egypt is 66%, according to UNICEF data, but 
among youths that number increases to 88% for males and 82% for 
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females.  The enormous disparity in education between the youth and the 
older generations gave young people the intellectual means to understand 
the extent of Mubarak’s failures on issues of life politics.  Additionally, 
the number of college graduates increased greatly in Egypt.  With a free 
education system, Egypt had created a young generation of “highly 
Westernized…youths from disadvantaged backgrounds…exposed to the 
world in ways that expand aspirations and ambitions” (Osman, 2010: 222).  
The dismal post-graduate unemployment opportunities increased 
frustration among the young generation. 
 The final life politics indicator examined in this paper is 
corruption.  Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
measures and ranks the countries of the world on a scale of 0-10, 
according to how corrupt their public sectors are perceived to be.  North 
Korea and Somalia have the most corrupt governments, with a score of 
1.0.  New Zealand and Denmark have the least corrupt governments, with 
scores of 9.5 and 9.4 respectively.  Egypt is ranked 112th of 164 countries, 
with a score of 2.9.  This indicates that the public sector is perceived as 
very corrupt.  This corruption further undermined the perceptions of the 
Mubarak regime as a legitimate authority acting in the best interest of the 
Egyptian people. 
 Ultimately, Mubarak’s regime failed to satisfy the basic needs of 
its people.  These needs were previously ignored in favor of nationalist 
pride under the traditional social, religious, and cultural foundations of 
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older Arabic societies.  In fact, his emphasis on telecommunications policy 
as a means of economic improvement served to undermine his own 
legitimacy by providing young generations with the ability to 
communicate and share these life politics struggles.  According to the 
Egyptian government’s May 2011 report “The Future of Internet 
Economy,” people under age 18 made up 35% of Internet users, and those 
aged 18-34 made up an additional 43% of Internet use meaning that 78% 
of users were under the age of 34.2  With so many issues 
disproportionately affecting youth, the consolidation of public opinion 
against the regime was developed through shared reactions and sentiments 
to specific events.  In Egypt, several incidents facilitated connections and 
trust between activists and their supporters, through both demonstration 
effects and Fisk’s Prodrome stage, which will both be explained in the 
following sections.   
 Through the development of NITs as a tool for communication 
among the young, educated population, the underlying causes of the 
Egyptian revolution evolved into a consolidated effort to bring down the 
Mubarak regime in 2011.  How did NITs become an actor in political 
movements? To answer this question, this paper examines several 
previous cases of political crises instigated by a young generation and NIT 
use that provided demonstration effects for the Egyptians in Tahrir Square 
and elsewhere. 
                                                 
2 http://mcit.gov.eg/Upcont/Documents/TheFutureofInternetEconomyIII.pdf 
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Demonstration Effects: Twitter Revolutions in Tunisia, Moldova, and 
Iran 
 
Han (2009) describes the demonstration effect as a series of five steps that 
allow a large number of individuals to realize the power of collective 
action as a result of previous actions, especially in the context of the 
networked public sphere.  First, there must be a non-political event that 
garners a great deal of attention among NIT-users.  Second, public 
discussions over the NPS serve as an alternative to traditional media.  
Third, the results of those discussions are expressed through both new and 
traditional media.  Fourth, the movements become political as activists 
consolidate and increase their understanding of the power they wield 
through test-run mobilizations.  Finally, the process ends with the 
construction of a “generational identity and consensus” (Han, 2007).  Han 
uses demonstration effects to explain how small groups of devoted and 
motivated activists can be catalysts for action by larger groups, a 
framework that can directly apply to the Egyptian case in 2011.  Both the 
Moldovan and Iranian uprisings in 2009 likely provided demonstration 
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effects for Arab youths due to both the temporal proximity and the similar 
use of OSM as an effective mobilization tool.   
 In his analysis, Han (2007) describes how the demonstration effect 
transformed previously apolitical and disparate young generations in 
South Korea into a politically cohesive unit through a series of non-
political test-run mobilizations in 2002.  After watching the 
disqualification of a Korean athlete in the 2002 Olympics, angry Korean 
youths brought down the official website of the Utah Winter Olympics by 
flooding the website with traffic.  This development was then covered by 
global new media outlets such as CNN, BBC, and the New York Times 
(Han, 2007).  Realizing the power they could wield as a group, young 
Koreans and the politicization of their social networks led to inherently 
political actions and campaigns.  Given the youth’s dominant use of NITs, 
particularly Twitter and other OSM, the Moldovan and Iranian precedents 
served as test-run mobilizations for the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in both 
Tunisia and Egypt.  The Tunisian revolution almost certainly informed the 
activists in Egypt on how to use OSM effectively to enact political change.  
The direct effect is evident in that the Egyptian revolution began less than 
two weeks after Ben Ali’s departure from the Tunisian presidency.   
 On April 6, 2009, the Communist Party in Moldova declared 
victory in parliamentary elections, despite pre-election projections of a 
close result.  Opposition groups Hyde Park and ThinkMoldova, alleged a 
fraudulent election and met to discuss a demonstration for the following 
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day.  According to the New York Times3, organizers were surprised by the 
sudden gathering of 10,000 protesters, having hastily disseminated 
information through text messages and social media.  The demonstrations 
turned to riots as protestors set fire to government buildings.  An election 
recount was taken, though the results remained ultimately unchanged.  
This spontaneous unrest demonstrated to Twitter users that NITs could be 
legitimate and potentially powerful mobilization tools. 
 It was another case of election fraud in Iran just two months later 
that ignited a torrent of political unrest.  Incumbent President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad declared victory only hours after polls closed.  Opposition 
figures and activists complained immediately, calling for protests and a 
fair election.  Protesters filled the streets, garnering international media 
attention due to the country’s size and regional influence.  For the next 
two months, the Iranian government tempered media coverage of the 
unrest, while pro-Ahmadinejad militias enforced stability4.  Videos and 
images captured by citizen journalists reached major media outlets 
through NITs like Twitter and Facebook, increasing awareness of the 
repression as well as intensifying international pressure on the Iranian 
regime.  Though ultimately unsuccessful, the revolutionary unrest in Iran 
provided a precedent for NIT action in Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries. 
                                                 
3 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/world/europe/08moldova.html?pagewanted=all 
4 http://articles.cnn.com/2009-07-25/world/iran.world.protests_1_iranian-american-
president-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-iranian-embassy?_s=PM:WORLD 
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 The 2011 Tunisian revolution directly inspired Egyptians to action 
and provided demonstration effects for the Egyptian activists.  In the wake 
of the Tunileaks scandal, in which diplomatic cables exposing the 
opulence of Ben Ali’s family were stolen and released online, Tunisians 
were very aware of the disconnect between the regime and its people.  On 
December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, the 26-year-old street vendor, lit 
himself on fire outside of the local government building in Sidi Bouzid, 
Tunisia5.  Locals protested and called for rallies in solidarity with 
Bouazizi, whose misfortunes and complaints were widely shared by other 
young Tunisians.  As the government struggled to control the dispersal of 
information over NITs and attempted an ill-fated publicity campaign, the 
protests spread.  Using the keyword #Sidibouzid, protesters relayed 
revolution-related materials to both fellow protesters and the outside 
world.  Ben Ali made several televised statements, instituting minor 
reforms and using traditional state-controlled media to threaten to apply 
the law “in all firmness” with regard to silencing the unrest.6  Protests 
continued to grow despite Ben Ali’s best efforts, and by January 8, the 
country had become dangerously unstable.  Resorting to violence, security 
forces fired on protesters, killing several protesters.  By January 13, the 
crackdown ended, and Ben Ali declared a state of emergency before 
                                                 
5http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/tunisia/index.ht
ml 
6 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/01/egypt-bomb-kills-new-year-churchgoers 
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fleeing the country with his family the following day.7  The success of the 
Tunisian revolution provided a direct and immediate example of a country 
using OSM such as Twitter to bring about democratic change in a country 
that had known only authoritarian leadership since its independence from 
France in 1956.  Interestingly, the Tunisian case also adhered to Fisk’s 
four stages of political crisis that this paper also applies to the movement 
in Egypt starting less than two weeks later. 
 
The Egyptian Revolution 
It took less than 20 days for Mubarak to transition from one of the most 
stable political leaders in the MENA region to a defeated dictator.  The 
revolution can be divided into several clearly defined stages that follow 
Fisk’s four stages of political crisis: Prodrome, Outbreak, Chronic, and 
Resolution.  Before this paper analyzes the contents of the tweets 
exchanged during each stage, it explores what happened with regards to 
the major events and mobilizations that brought about the end of 
Mubarak’s regime. Despite the similarities between the Tunisian and 
Egyptian revolutions, there are several notable differences.  First, it must 
be noted that the Egyptian military was much more involved in decision-
making than was its Tunisian counterpart.  Mubarak’s departure was part 
of a coup conducted by the military establishment reacting to the protests.  
During the later stages of the crisis, the army also played an important role 
                                                 
7 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests 
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in stabilizing the protests in Tahrir Square.  Also, the motivations of the 
Egyptian uprising were more immediately political, given Ben Ali’s recent 
departure.  Egyptian activists capitalized on the momentum begun in 
Tunisia, mobilizing their educated cohorts over life politics issues and 
general dissatisfaction. 
 
 
 
Prodrome 
Keeping these two ideas in mind, this section examines four major events 
as important indicators of the Prodrome stage.  This stage consists of the 
series of events that signal an impending political crisis.  In April 2008, 
Internet organizers created the April 6 Youth Movement, a Facebook group 
that served as a forum for complaints and revolutionary ideas.  Leaders of 
this group were often arrested or intimidated by the Mubarak regime.  The 
second event was the murder of blogger and activist Khaled Said in the 
summer of 2010, which resulted in public outrage and protests against 
police brutality.  Third was the destabilizing Alexandria church bombing 
on January 1, 2011, and fourth was the success of the Tunisian revolution 
on January 14.   
 On April 6, 2008, a massive protest by workers in Mahalla al-
Kobra, Egypt, was suppressed by security forces.8  Four protesters were 
                                                 
8 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/inside-april6-movement/ 
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killed and 400 arrested.  On March 23, the April 6 Youth Movement was 
created on Facebook to gather support for the protests.  According to 
research by PBS, the expansion of the group was viral.  “The group 
invited about 300 people to join its Facebook page; within a day it had 
3,000 members and within a few weeks, 70,000 had joined the call for 
strikes across Egypt in support of Mahalla’s workers” (Inside the April 6 
Movement, PBS).  The group remained active in calling for anti-
government strikes and actions through the 2011 revolution.  The creation 
of this group indicates both the existence of demonstration effects and the 
Prodome stage of the political crisis. 
 The extent of the corruption and police brutality in Egypt was 
manifested in the case of Khaled Said, a young Internet activist who had 
posted videos of corrupt police activity online.  According to reports, in 
June 2010, Said was confronted by police officers in an Alexandria 
Internet café, taken outside, and beaten.  He later died of the severe 
wounds inflicted by the officers.  His family, upon seeing his body, 
captured a cell phone image of his injuries and posted the picture online.  
Young Egyptians were outraged, and Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian Google 
Executive helped found a Facebook group named We Are All Khaled 
Said.
9
  The group raised awareness of Said’s death and expressed 
solidarity with his family.  Along with the April 6 Youth Movement 
Facebook group, We Are All Khaled Said served as a major mobilization 
                                                 
9 http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/61266 
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tool during the revolution.  Though the detainment of dissidents and the 
censorship of NITs was not uncommon in Egypt, Said’s death contributed 
to the anti-government momentum that would converge on January 25, 
2011.  
 After the public outrage over Said’s death had largely subsided, 
another Prodrome incident occurred, further heightening dissatisfaction 
with the government.  On January 1, 2011, a bomb exploded outside a 
Coptic Church, killing 21 people. According to The Guardian, hundreds 
of the Christian sect’s members protested in the streets.  President Hosni 
Mubarak made a statement on state television promising to “cut off the 
hands of terrorists and those plotting against Egypt’s security.” 10  This 
issue was interesting for two reasons.  First, it created actual unrest and 
demonstrations, indicating that an outbreak event was going to arrive 
soon.  Second, it was a perfect representation of why young Egyptians did 
not support Mubarak.  His regime depended so heavily on security policy 
that when it briefly failed, it exposed his weakness in the areas of life 
politics.   
 The final Prodrome event was the Tunisian Revolution. Egyptian 
activists followed the Tunisian case with great interest, having suffered 
from many of the same life politics deficiencies.  The protesters’ victory in 
Tunisia provided both the framework and inspiration necessary for 
Egyptian activists to call for their own protests.  Using the Twitter hash 
                                                 
10 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/01/egypt-bomb-kills-new-year-churchgoers 
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tag #Jan25 (representing the day of the planned protest), activists knew 
that successful protests were possible.  It was this first planned day of 
protests that propelled the political crisis into Fisk’s second stage. 
 
Outbreak 
The outbreak of the Egyptian crisis began on January 25, the country’s 
national police holiday, as thousands of protesters gathered in various 
locations around Egypt, marching toward Tahrir Square.  Many prominent 
opposition groups had announced their intentions to participate in the 
protests.  The organizers were unsure of how successful their plans would 
be, with journalist Fathya Eldakhakhny going as far as to say that if no one 
had fulfilled their commitments on the first day, the revolution would 
likely never have begun (Eldakhakhny, 4/15/2012).  In Cairo, small 
protests converged in Tahrir Square, which became the epicenter of the 
revolution.  The protests remained relatively peaceful, although sporadic 
clashes led to the deaths of three protesters and one police officer, 
according to Egypt’s Interior Minister.  Despite the early political 
aspirations of the protesters, there was no widely accepted set of demands 
and goals. 
 On January 26 and 27, the protests persisted.  A violent police 
response in Suez increased fears and uncertainty around the movement.  
Access to OSM was limited in an attempt to isolate protesters.  Police used 
tear gas and rubber bullets in an attempt to disperse demonstrators, as 
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Tahrir Square became a popular destination for protests.  According to The 
Guardian, foreign journalists were intimidated and beaten to prevent the 
international community from accessing accurate and unbiased 
information related to the protests.11  Anticipation was building for even 
larger protests called for January 28.  The protests were on the verge of 
entering Fisk’s chronic stage, in when the unrest extends from a single 
outbreak event into a prolonged political crisis with potentially devastating 
results. 
 
Chronic 
The chronic stage began in the first minutes of January 28, when each of 
Egypt’s five major Internet Service Providers had shut off their services 
entirely within half an hour.  Only one ISP, Noor, maintained service for 
another two days due to its important role in the Egyptian economy.  
These developments led to international confusion and fears of a 
massacre.  As fragments of information escaped, Internet activist groups 
like Anonymous published and distributed lists of strategies to circumvent 
the Internet block. 12   
 While some clashes broke out on the January 28 “Day of 
Departure”, no extensive violence marred the movement.  On this day, 
Mubarak fired his government, promising reforms and appointing Omar 
                                                 
11 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/27/egypt-riot-security-force-action 
12 http://www.abdolian.com/thoughts/?p=4699 
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Suleiman as Vice President. 13  While this was intended as a concession, 
Suleiman was a well-known security advisor and strongly disliked by 
protesters.  As anti-Mubarak demonstrations intensified, the Egyptian 
military intervened to provide security, serving mainly to deter violence in 
Tahrir Square.  On February 1, organizers called for a “March of a 
Million” that was intended to force Mubarak from office.  Masses of 
protesters spilled into Tahrir Square, only to hear Mubarak announce his 
intention to step down after overseeing a transition of power.   
 The momentum shifted away from protesters on February 2, when 
violent clashes broke out across the country.  Internet service was restored 
throughout the day on February 1, and Vodafone reported that its services 
had been forced to send pro-Mubarak messages.  These messages 
reportedly called for a final assault on the anti-Mubarak demonstrators in 
Tahrir.  Later on February 2, heavily-armed pro-Mubarak activists, some 
on camel and horseback, fought with opposing protesters as the military 
watched. 14  Foreign journalists were attacked as the regime blamed 
external influences for the violence.  The seemingly organized violence 
did not last, and the Tahrir movement was not defeated.  Vice President 
Suleiman began negotiations with opposition representatives on February 
                                                 
13 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/30/egypt-protests-hosni-mubarak-power 
14 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/02/hosni-mubarak-supporters-violence-
cairo 
 26 
6, resulting in several concessions including a 15% wage increase for 
public sector employees. 15 
 A final momentum shift occurred with the February 7 
release of Wael Ghonim, who had been detained during the first 
days of the revolution.16  Pressure continued to build on Mubarak as he 
continued to concede minor political reforms to the protesters.  On 
February 10, rumors spread that Mubarak would step down after U.S. 
President Barack Obama’s call for an immediate transfer of power to a 
democratic regime.  However, Mubarak’s much-anticipated speech 
stubbornly repeated his intention to step down at the end of his term.  With 
the momentum on the side of the protests, the resolution of the crisis was 
near.  
 
Resolution 
On February 11, just one later, Vice President Suleiman appeared on state 
television, announcing Mubarak’s resignation.17  The demonstrators in 
Tahrir Square and around the country celebrated as the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces took power from Mubarak.  Human Rights Watch 
reported that over 300 Egyptians were killed throughout the country since 
                                                 
15 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/07/egypt-cabinet-announces-salaries-
pensions-rise 
16 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/08/wael-ghonim-tahrir-square 
17
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo 
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the beginning of the revolution.18  Though Mubarak fled to Saudi Arabia, 
the military has maintained the preeminent role in decision-making.  The 
institution’s reluctance to relinquish power has led to protests that 
continued long after the resolution of this particular crisis.  By correlating 
the results of the Twitter content analysis with Egypt’s chronology 
according to Fisk’s four stages allows us to obtain a clearer picture of the 
role that the Twitter-created NPS can play in future revolutionary 
movements. 
 
 
 
 
Reading Categories of Tweets from the Egyptian Revolution 
Dataset 
The NIST Tweets2011 archive is comprised of 16 million tweets collected 
from January 23 to February 8, 2011.  The tweets serve as a primary 
account of the Egyptian revolution, and a content analysis helps us verify 
the chronology as well as explain how Twitter was used during the 
uprising.  This paper created a database of 37,613 chronologically ordered 
tweets identified by major hash tags used by protest organizers 
(#Sidibouzid, #Tunisia, #Jan25, #Egypt) and others that commonly 
appeared alongside them (#Tunisie, #Tahrir, #Cairo, #Mubarak, 
                                                 
18 http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/08/egypt-documented-death-toll-protests-tops-300 
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#Revolution, #Arabspring).  #Sidibouzid and #Jan25 were used by protest 
organizers to identify tweets relating to the Jasmine Revolution protests in 
Tunisia and Egypt respectively.  The information contained in the 
database reveals the date and time the tweet was sent, a specific Twitter 
ID, and the message content of the tweet itself. 
 
Natural Language Processing and Automatic Content Analysis 
To get the most information out of this dataset, this paper conducts an 
Automatic Content Analysis of the 37,613-tweet database (Han, 2012).  
This entails the creation of a Java program that identified tweets based on 
extracted key patterns (or micro-expressions) within a tweet’s actual 
message.  While this research strategy was based off of Han’s (2012) 
analysis of the Twitter-created NPS and its response to Obama’s health 
care initiative, it attempts a slightly different and more nuanced approach. 
In Han’s automatic content analysis, patterns were collected and used for 
two purposes: 1) to identify the sentiment of tweets, whether in support of 
or against the health care bill, and 2) to analyze tweets in a single “Call-to-
Action” category. The research in this paper attempts to conduct a more 
complicated automatic content analysis, looking at a variety of categories 
and how their fluctuations can expound upon the existing chronology in 
Egypt.  Also, the sentiment of Twitter users was so overwhelmingly 
favorable toward the anti-Mubarak protesters that a sentiment analysis 
would not provide useful information. 
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 Automatic content analysis is just one strategy within the larger 
method of analyzing the Twitter-created NPS known as natural language 
processing (NLP). NLP involves the creation of a computer program that 
can automatically identify the sentiment of tweets and categorize them, 
according to multiple languages, the intention of sender, and additional 
factors.  Although this will likely be an effective way to conduct research 
related to the Twitter-created NPS in the future, this paper did not have 
access to sophisticated natural language processing technology.  By 
developing its own patterns to be used for an automatic content analysis, 
this paper was able to adapt the analytical strategy to this particular case, 
the Egyptian revolution.  This research can provide some insight into the 
use of Twitter in this specific case while also serving as a stepping-stone 
to future NLP research. 
 
Creating Analytical Categories 
The first step toward performing an automatic content analysis was to 
identify key categories and patterns that would be used to differentiate 
between those categories.  This was achieved through the manual 
annotation of tweet samples.  The researchers extracted random samples 
of tweets from each of the political crisis stages reflected in the archive 
(see Table 2):  
 
 
Table 2 – Tweets Manually Annotated for Category Development 
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Political Crisis Stage Dates Manually Annotated Total Tweets  
Prodrome Jan. 23-24 339 339 
Outbreak Jan. 25-27 1,958 4,534 
Chronic (Blackout) Jan. 28-Feb. 1 1,533 15,939 
Chronic (Post-Blackout) Feb. 2-Feb. 8 1,482 16,827 
Total Jan. 23-Feb. 8 5,312 37,639 
 
 
The Prodrome stage includes tweets from January 23 and 24, given that 
the archive began collecting tweets on January 23 and the Outbreak stage 
began on January 25.  This accounts for the relatively small sample size in 
the Prodrome stage.  The Outbreak stage would last for three days, until 
January 28.  The Chronic stage was divided into two sections: Blackout 
and Post-Blackout.  On January 28, the Chronic stage began when 
Mubarak’s Internet censorship policy was implemented while the largest 
protests yet flooded major city centers.  The Chronic (Blackout) stage 
lasted until the end of February 1, when Internet and mobile phone service 
were restored.  The Chronic (Post-Blackout) stage lasted until the end of 
the archive on February 8.  This division is unique to the Egyptian case 
and was used to examine the effects of Mubarak’s unprecedented 
censorship policy.  It must be noted that the dataset excluded the 
Resolution stage because the crisis was resolved on February 11.  Random 
samples were annotated from each of the three stages: 313 from the 
Prodrome stage, 1,958 from the Outbreak stage, 1,533 from the Chronic 
(Blackout) stage and 1,482 from the Chronic (Post-Blackout) stage.   
 Each of these samples was physically annotated by the researchers 
to develop relevant and distinct categories. Manual annotation also 
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provides a more intimate and accurate understanding of the tweet’s 
primary intention than would a computer program.  Therefore, the results 
of this manual annotation should accurately reflect Twitter use during the 
uprising.  From the manual annotation, 6 major categories were developed 
(See Table 3).   
 
1.0 The first major category, Information Sharing (IS) involves tweets that 
are intended to inform others of events or updates regarding the 
revolution.  This is a broad category, and therefore is divided up into four 
subcategories: General Information Sharing and Updates, Critical 
Information for Call to Action, Demonstration Effects, and Request for 
Information. 
 
1.1 The first subcategory is General Information Sharing and Update, or 
(GIS/UP). This category is used for the most basic information sharing 
that could either express general facts or situational updates. It also 
contains updates from CNN, Reuters, Al Jazeera, or other traditional 
media organizations that covered the Egyptian uprising.  This GIS/UP 
tweet, from the prodromal stage, provides an update regarding the protests 
in Tunisia that reemerged after Ben Ali’s departure.  
 “Confirmed sources report #libya military deployed to #tunisia 
 border. More info will be posted as it comes in #sidibouzid #war” 
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1.2 The second subcategory is Critical Information for Call to Action 
(CICTA). This category includes tweets intended to directly share 
actionable information with demonstrators.  For example, many tweets 
discussed locations of particular protests, police tactics, or strategies for 
circumventing the Internet blackout.  By providing the IP numbers at 
which these websites were accessible, this tweet directly helped protesters 
access updates about the progress of the uprising: 
 “RT @mimistim Please RT: #Egypt only blocking DNS. For 
 Twitter: http://128.242.245.248 For Facebook: http://69.63.189.11” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Titles and Definitions of Analytical Categories 
Table 3 – Titles and  
 33 
 
 
 
1
. 
 
 
1
.
3
 
T
h
e
 
t
hird subcategory is Demonstration Effect (DEMO).  This contains tweets 
that relate the revolution in Egypt to unrest in countries around the world.  
In terms of previous demonstrations, this mostly includes tweets regarding 
the Tunisian revolution, but also commonly included the 1988 Tianamen 
Square democracy protests in China.  Many of the tweets related to other 
Jasmine Revolution protests include the names of countries where unrest 
was occurring, such as Yemen, Sudan, and Libya.  An example of a 
DEMO category tweet is: 
 “RT @AfriNomad: “Yesterday we were all Tunisian. Today we 
 are all Egyptian. Tomorrow we’ll all be free” #jan25 #Egypt” 
1. Information Sharing  IS  
  1.1 General Info 
Sharing/Update                    
GIS/UP Provide non-specific info about protests for the 
purpose of informing readers 
  1.2 Critical Info for Call 
To Action 
CICTA Mention specific location and activities, tactical or 
safety info with the intent of helping protesters 
  1.3 Demonstration 
Effect 
DEMO Specify about the relationship between the 
Egyptian Revolution and other events, past, 
present, and future events that have influenced or 
been influenced by the unrest 
  1.4 Request for 
Information 
REQ Questions regarding events, opinions, and 
responses 
2. Call To Action CTA  
   2.1 Direct CTA  DIR Ask individuals to perform physical actions to 
either support or participate in protests 
   2.2 Retweet/Internet 
Action 
RET Requesting interactive Internet action (ie. Share, 
Follow, Spread) 
   2.3 Link/Video/Photo LINK Requesting non-interactive action by providing link 
to photos, videos, or articles 
   2.4 Call for Support CS Requesting assistance or calling for international 
action 
3. Expression of Support ES Statement with pro-demonstrator sentiment 
4. Opinion O Individual perspectives on events 
5. Irrelevant IR Unrelated or non-Arabic foreign language 
6. Arabic  ARB Relevant and in Arabic language  
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1.4 The final information sharing subcategory is Request for Information 
(REQ).  This includes any questions Twitter users asked regarding events 
in Egypt during the revolution.  There is a large variety of requests, 
ranging in specificity.  One example of a tweet from REQ category is: 
 “Is it confirmed? RT @nmoawad #Twitter was blocked in #Egypt” 
  
2.0 The next major category is Call to Action (CTA).  These types of 
tweets ask readers to perform a variety of actions, from demonstrating in 
the streets to pressuring their own governments.  This category is also 
divided into four subcategories: Direct Call to Action, Retweet and 
Internet Action, Link/Video/Photo, and Call for Support. 
 
2.1 The Direct Call to Action subcategory (DIR) includes tweets that ask 
others to participate in physical actions.  This mostly included calling for 
protests in Egypt, but solidarity protests in other countries were also 
advertised on Twitter. The following tweet clearly states a time and 
location for a physical action, inviting the readers to participate in the 
action: 
 “Please spread this as much as possible; any1 that gives anyother 
 locations tell them all 2 head 2 ta7reer [Tahrir Square] we’ll meet 
 there at 12 #jan25” 
 
 35 
2.2 The second subcategory is Retweet and Internet Action (RET).  This 
entails tweets that ask for readers to participate in an interactive way.  In 
the Twitter-created NPS, asking readers to “retweet” means to copy the 
message, enabling it to reach the maximum number of social networks.  
Tweets also called for readers to “spread the word” or “share with 
friends”.  This is an inherently interactive CTA.  For example: 
 “SMS ur friends, ppl are gathering in ElSa3a sqr! SMS and RT 
 Quickly. #Jan25 #Egypt” 
 
2.3 The third subcategory is Link/Video/Photo (LINK), which calls for 
actions that are not inherently interactive. They provide articles, videos or 
pictures from the protests that spread awareness of the events in Egypt.  
These tweets often explicitly state “Read this” or “Amazing picture.” For 
example: 
 “High quality pics of the demonstration http://goo.gl/rJUxC #Jan25  
 #Egypt #Tahrir” 
 
2.4 Call for Support (CS) is the final CTA subcategory.  Instead of asking 
the reader to perform a specific action, these tweets request direct and 
indirect support to help the protesters in Egypt.  This can include asking 
for medical supplies to tend for the wounded or concise requests for help.  
For example: 
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 “SUEZ IS A KILLING ZONE AND completely LOCKED 
 DOWN SAVE US (RT) #Jan25 #Egypt #25jan” 
 
3.0 The third major category is Expression of Support (ES).  This, as the 
name suggests, involves senders who are expressing solidarity with 
protesters.  It ranges from criticisms of Mubarak to respect for the 
demonstrators.  One example of the ES category: 
 “Good Morning, #Egypt. Love and solidarity coming your way 
 from around the world as your prepare for #Jan25 protests. Be safe 
 Be Free!” 
 
4.0 The fourth category is Opinion (O).  This category consists of tweets 
that contain phrases such as “I think” or “I believe”.  An example of an O 
tweet is: 
 “US is clearly trying to play both sides: government &amp; 
 people. I think that means it believes uprising can topple Mubarak 
 #jan25 #egypt” 
 
5.0 The fifth category is reserved for those tweets that are irrelevant (IR). 
This includes tweets that are not related to the uprising as well as non-
Arabic foreign language tweets.  In the automatic content analysis, this 
category is represented by those tweets uncategorized by the program.  
The tweets have become essentially unrelated to the crisis, although a 
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more developed language processing program could shed light on the 
multilingual uses of Twitter during a political crisis.  An example of an 
irrelevant tweet is: 
 “The cat in the hat in Egypt = the Sphinx. :)” 
 
6.0 The sixth category is Arabic tweets (ARB).  This category presents a 
problem for interpretation because the Automatic Content Analysis 
program could not read languages other than English.  A small set of 
keywords was translated from English into Arabic.  This set of words was 
then used to identify Arabic tweets related to the revolution.  Due to the 
inability to translate large numbers of Arabic tweets, the ARB category 
does not provide directly actionable data.  However, the quantity of tweets 
in each stage can provide some information to verify the chronology of the 
uprising.  
 
Automatic Content Analysis Methodology 
Having identified the twelve categories and subcategories that would be 
used to organize the dataset, the next step was to create a computer 
program capable of identifying categories.  The program required patterns 
that differentiated each category.  As stated previously, the patterns were 
obtained during the manual annotation and were expressed in the same 
format as those in Han’s (2012) Obama health care Twitter analysis (Han, 
2012: 16).  For example, the key patterns “gather yourselves”, “meet 
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here”, or “join us” are just a few that would indicate the DIR category, as 
they call for direct physical action.  Each category was given a varying 
number of patterns determined by what was found during the manual 
annotation.   
 Next, the first set of patterns was put into the program, creating a 
rough draft of results.  This initial draft was used to inform a second 
version, when more patterns were inserted to increase the accuracy and 
coverage of the program. For example, the DEMO category used the 
pattern “Tunisian effect” in the initial draft.  After displaying negligible 
results, related patterns “Tunisian demonstration” and “domino effect” 
were added.  This allowed the program to include more tweets in its 
analysis.  Over- and underrepresentation for individual categories were 
consistent problems, being a byproduct of individual expression and the 
program’s level of sophistication. 
 After a preliminary version of the program was created, results 
were gathered and the program was tested for accuracy and coverage.  
Modeled after Han’s (2012) error sampling strategy, three samples of 
tweets were selected (100, 200, and 200 tweets) from the overall dataset 
(Han, 2012: 17).  These samples were manually annotated and categorized 
according to the reader.  Subsequently, the sample groups were run 
through the automatic content analysis program and the results of the two 
analyses were compared.  After each iteration, revisions were made to 
 39 
create a more inclusive program.  Table 4 contains the results from the 
third error test.  
 
 
Table 4 – Final Error Testing Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As is clear from Table 4, issues regarding the program’s accuracy and 
coverage of the dataset were not effectively resolved during the revision 
process thus far.  While some categories, such as GIS/UP, boast a very 
high accuracy rate (98%), the majority of the other categories are seriously 
flawed.  This is likely a result of several factors.  In addition to the 
language barrier, there are other limits to this research that must be 
addressed to help illuminate areas of improvement for future studies.  
First, determining the intentions of the sender is difficult, even during 
manual annotation, given that “tweeters express opinions by referring to 
persons or events, or by striving for originality of expression” (Han, 2012: 
 200M 200A Accuracy 
GIS/UP 50 49 98% 
CICTA 13 50 26% 
DEMO 2 7 29% 
REQ 13 20 65% 
DIR 2 0 0% 
RET 6 17 35% 
LINK 29 57 51% 
CS 5 10 50% 
ES 11 5 45% 
O 22 10 45% 
IR 15 0 0% 
ARB 32 18 56% 
Not Matched 0 48 N/A 
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11).  Though the intentions of many tweets are explicit, the categorization 
of tweets is often relatively subjective.   
 Also, this paper must further define the difference between tweets 
and patterns, and develop a program that can effectively differentiate 
between the two. While the manual annotation went through the tweets to 
find their primary goals (1 Tweet equals 1 Category), the automatic 
content analysis simply extracted patterns (1 Tweet can equal 1 or more 
Categories).  This means that tweets containing multiple patterns were 
recorded more than once in the automatic content analysis.  This is an 
issue because the program could not identify more specific information 
about these multiple-pattern tweets.  One example of a manually annotated 
multiple-pattern tweet is:  
 “RETWEET RETWEET RETWEET SUEZ LIVE NEW VIDEOS 
 PRAY FOR EGYPT! http://bit.ly/ftBjdX #voiceleaks #egypt 
 #jan25 #we #the #people”  
 
This individual tweet fits into the categories of Retweet/Internet action 
(RETWEET), support (PRAY FOR EGYPT!), and Link/Photo/Video 
(LIVE NEW VIDEOS).  In this paper, multiple category tweets are 
included in each relevant category.  Though marked as a RET tweet in the 
manual annotation, the automatic content analysis program would identify 
at least three categories from this single tweet.  Though it is not possible to 
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glean information on the identity of individual tweets that belong to 
multiple categories, the number has been calculated.   
 Yet the inaccuracy of this paper’s automatic content analysis 
program does not necessarily preclude this paper from examining 
important trends in Twitter use over the duration of a political crisis.  By 
comparing the results of the initial manual annotation (Table 5) with the 
automatic content analysis results (Table 7), the trends are monitored and 
analyzed in the following section. 
 
Presentation and Analysis of Results 
The results of the manual annotation and automatic content analysis reveal 
that Twitter use does indeed reflect the progression of the political crisis 
from the Prodrome through the Chronic stage.  This section presents an 
analysis of the Twitter-created NPS during the Egyptian Revolution.  The 
interaction of the twelve categories can be used to explain the uprising in 
an as of yet unobserved way.    
 According to Table 5, there are a number of key trends that can be 
observed and explained both within each stage and throughout the 
duration of the Egyptian political crisis.  During the Prodromal stage, from 
Jan. 23-24, the prevalence of information sharing is clear, making up 
nearly one-third of tweets annotated in this stage.  Many of the updates are 
regarding either the recently deposed Tunisian leader Ben Ali or the 
January 1st church bombing in Alexandria.  Also prominent is the DEMO 
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category, which contains examples of the Tunisian revolution and praises 
the role of social media in the success of the uprising in Tunisia.   
 
Table 5 – Manual Annotation Results – Measured in Tweets 
 
 
 
 
  
A
m
o
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
C
T
A
 
s
u
b
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
,
 
L
I
N
K
 
i 
 Prodrome Outbreak Chronic (BO) Chronic 
(Post-BO) 
 
 Jan. 23-24 Jan. 25-27 Jan. 28-Feb. 1 Feb. 2-Feb. 8 Total 
1.0 IS      
1.1 
GIS/UP 
105  
(18.5%) 
482 
(24.6%) 
544  
(35.6%) 
396 
(26.7%) 
1,533 
(27.7%) 
1.2 
CICTA 
1  
(0.2%) 
102 
(5.2%) 
121  
(7.9%) 
113  
(7.6%) 
337 
(6.1%) 
1.3 
DEMO 
63  
(10.9%) 
68  
(3.5%) 
38  
(2.4%) 
30  
(2.1%) 
199 
(3.6%) 
1.4 REQ 7  
(1.2%) 
68  
(3.5%) 
44  
(2.9%) 
55  
(3.7%) 
174 
(3.1%) 
Subtotal 176  
(30.8%) 
720 
(36.8%) 
747  
(48.8%) 
594 
 (40.1%) 
2,243 
(40.5%) 
      
2.0 CTA      
2.1 DIR 4  
(0.6%) 
74  
(3.8%) 
38  
(2.5%) 
63  
(4.2%) 
179 
(3.2%) 
2.2 RET 12  
(2.1%) 
108 
(5.5%) 
68  
(4.4%) 
51  
(3.4%) 
239 
(4.3%) 
2.3 LINK 32  
(5.2%) 
129 
(6.6%) 
93  
(6.1%) 
140  
(9.4%) 
389 
(7%) 
2.4 CS 0  
(0%) 
39  
(2%) 
7  
(0.5%) 
18  
(1.2%) 
64 
(1.2%) 
Subtotal 48  
(7.9%) 
350 
(17.9%) 
206  
(13.5%) 
272  
(18.2%) 
871 
(15.7%) 
      
3.0 ES 9  
(1.6%) 
191 
(9.8%) 
79  
(5.2%) 
122 
(8.2%) 
401 
(7.2%) 
4.0 O 25  
(4.3%) 
82  
(4.2%) 
168  
(11%) 
105  
(7.1%) 
380 
(6.9%) 
5.0 ARB 174  
(30.1%) 
584  
(30%) 
308  
(20.1%) 
337  
(22.7%) 
1,403 
(25.3%) 
6.0 IR 147  
(25.4%) 
31  
(1.6%) 
25  
(1.6%) 
52  
(3.5%) 
254 
(4.6%) 
      
TOTAL 579 
(100%) 
1,958 
(100%) 
1,533 
(100%) 
1,482 
(100%) 
5,552 
(100%) 
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According to Table 5, there are a number of key trends that can be 
observed and explained both within each stage and throughout the 
duration of the Egyptian political crisis.  During the Prodromal stage, from 
Jan. 23-24, the prevalence of information sharing is clear, making up 
nearly one-third of tweets annotated in this stage.  Many of the updates are 
regarding either the recently deposed Tunisian leader Ben Ali or the 
January 1st church bombing in Alexandria.  Also prominent is the DEMO 
category, which contains examples of the Tunisian revolution and praises 
the role of social media in the success of the uprising in Tunisia.   
 Among the CTA subcategories, LINK is by far the most popular, 
with 5.1% of the total.  Links, photos, and videos are helpful ways for 
Twitter users to share a story longer than can fit in one 140-character 
Twitter message.  During this stage, many of the links connected the 
reader to articles regarding the issues highlighted in the information 
sharing tweets.  As mentioned previously, the IR tweets, which contain 
languages other than Arabic and English, were relatively high in this stage 
because the manual sample was so small that it required the researchers to 
include tweets with an expanded set of keywords to analyze properly.  The 
number of Arabic tweets was also fairly high, making up over 21% of the 
Prodromal stage.  This is to be expected, however, as the lack of language 
technology prevents further analysis and division of Arabic tweets by their 
contents. 
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 The Outbreak stage saw several changes in category prevalence.  
While GIS/UP maintained the most prominent role in the Twitter-created 
NPS, fluctuations among other categories provide some insight into how 
Twitter use changed.  CICTA rose to 5.2%, a sizeable increase from its 
.2% in the Prodromal stage.  This increase is not surprising, given the 
necessity of important information in the early stages of a political crisis.  
These tweets often expressed the locations of protests or police, 
undoubtedly assisting other protesters and their participation in the 
January 25 events.  Call to Action tweets also increased greatly during the 
Prodromal stage. DIR, RET, and LINK all increased, indicating the 
emergence of a large interactive movement on the ground that was 
reflected through Twitter use.  Finally, while the DEMO, DOM, CS, and 
O categories remained relatively low, tweets expressing support for the 
protesters jumped from 2.9% in the Prodromal stage to 9.8%.  ES tweets 
encouraged the protesters in Egypt to persist in their drive for democracy, 
assuring them that they were not alone in the struggle. 
 Mubarak had just initiated the Internet blackout when the Chronic 
stage began on January 28.  By isolating his country from the NPS, several 
changes occurred in Twitter use.  Information sharing categories rose to 
higher levels than before, with GIS/UP accounting for over 35% of the 
tweets.  Many of these tweets involved informing others around the world 
of the Internet shutdown, raising awareness and galvanizing Internet users 
from around the world.  Also, the CICTA category continued to rise.  
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Much of this critical information consisted of advice on how to access the 
Internet or circumvent the blackout in other ways, from dial-up 
connections to ham radios and satellite phones.  Additionally, LINK 
tweets continued to be the most common CTA category, though the 
blackout limited the amounts of pictures and videos that could escape 
from Egypt.  ES tweets fell to 5.2%, while opinion tweets rose nearly 7% 
as stunned Internet users around the world reacted to Egypt’s Internet 
censorship.  Most telling, the number of Arabic tweets dropped 
dramatically.  While some international companies worked to provide 
Internet services to Egyptians, the shutdown policy was effective in 
silencing most online voices inside Egypt. However, the policy was 
counterproductive in that it consolidated public opinion outside of Egypt 
and also cost the Egyptian government tens of millions of dollars in lost 
business.  
 The blackout was lifted on the morning of February 2, but this was 
not an indication of Mubarak’s impending resignation.  As pro-Mubarak 
demonstrators poured into Tahrir Square in Cairo, clashing with the anti-
government protesters, the relationships between the categories changed 
once again.  GIS/UP remained the highest category, with over 26% of the 
tweets manually annotated during this stage.  LINK and ES experienced 
increases, as pictures and videos emerged from Egypt for the first time 
since the Outbreak stage.  In the midst of the violence on February 2, call 
for support tweets increased with protesters asking for medical assistance 
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as well as international pressure on the regime.  Solidarity protests were 
planned at Egyptian embassies around the world, indicated by the increase 
of DIR tweets from 2.5% to 4.2%.   
 Overall, it is clear that GIS/UP dominated the Twitter-created NPS 
during the Egyptian political crisis, making up over 27% of the total 
manually annotated tweets.  Foreign language and Arabic tweets make up 
the next largest segment with the whole variety of categories 
indeterminable from each other.  The second tier of readable categories 
consists of CICTA, RET, ES, and O.  This result is interesting because it 
suggests that that the Twitter-created NPS is not so much a tool for 
physical mobilization, but rather one for Internet action and solidarity.  
While only CICTA and RET could provide any real assistance for people 
in Egypt, ES and O tweets provided confidence to the protesters.  The 
sense of solidarity encouraged the protesters to continue pursuing their 
democratic interests despite the power of the regime. 
 But would the results of the automatic content analysis reflect a 
similar progression of Twitter use throughout the crisis?  Despite the 
aforementioned inaccuracies and issues, there were similarities between 
the results.  First, the prevalence on information sharing remains clear.  To 
correctly interpret the data from the automatic content analysis, it is 
important to refer to Table 6, which explains the number of tweets put 
through the program. 
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Table 6 – Total numbers of tweets read by Automatic Content Analysis 
Program 
 
 
 
T
h
e
The first row contains the total number of tweets present in the hash-tag 
filtered dataset for each political crisis stage.  There were 313 tweets in the 
Prodromal stage, 4,534 in the Outbreak, 15,939 in the Chronic (Blackout), 
and 16,827 in the Chronic (Post-Blackout).  This creates a total of 37,613 
tweets in the dataset.  The second row explains how many tweets were 
matched into categories by the program.  This value does not take into 
account the possibility of multiple category tweets.  In the Prodromal 
stage, for example, 190 of the 313 overall tweets were matched to one or 
more of the categories, while in the Outbreak stage, 3,240 of the 4,534 
overall tweets were matched to one or more of the categories.   
 Though our program could not identify the specific categories 
involved in multiple category tweets, the third row provides insight as to 
how many tweets fit into multiple categories.  For example, in the 
Prodromal stage, while only 190 tweets were matched, 295 patterns were 
recognized.  This implies that 105 patterns were a part of multiple 
category tweets.  And in the Outbreak stage, though only 3,240 actual 
tweets were matched, 4,939 patterns were recognized, implying that 1,699 
patterns were a part of multiple category tweets.  Overall, though only 
 Prodrome Outbreak Chronic  
(Blackout) 
Chronic  
(Post-Blackout) 
Total 
Total Entered 313 4,534 15,939 16,827 37,639 
Matched 190 3,240 11,390 12,497 27,336 
Number of 
Category Hits 
295 4,939  17,819  19,757  42,844  
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27,336 of the 37,613 tweets in the dataset were matched, 42,844 patterns 
were recognized.  This means that 15,508 patterns were part of multiple 
category tweets. This explains why the number of total category hits 
exceeds both the number of matched tweets and the number of tweets.  
Table 7 – Automatic Content Analysis Results for Patterns Recognized 
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 Jan. 23-24 Jan. 25-27 Jan. 28-Feb. 1 Feb. 2-Feb. 8 Total 
1.0 IS      
1.1 
GIS/UP 
48 
(25.3%) 
717 
(22.1%) 
3,904  
(34.3%) 
3,243  
(26.0%) 
7,916 
(29.0%) 
1.2 
CICTA 
19  
(10%) 
799 
(24.7%) 
3,052  
(27.0%) 
5,033  
(40.3%) 
8,904 
(32.6%) 
1.3 
DEMO 
8  
(4.2%) 
140 
(4.3%) 
589  
(5.2%) 
505  
(4.0%) 
1,245 
(4.5%) 
1.4 REQ 25 
(13.2%) 
296 
(9.1%) 
1,258  
(11.0%) 
1,346  
(10.8%) 
2,926 
(10.7%) 
Subtotal 100 
(52.6%) 
1,952 
(60.2%) 
8,803  
(77.3%) 
10,127 
(81.0%) 
20,991 
(76.8%) 
      
2.0 CTA      
2.1 DIR 0  
(0%) 
20  
(0.6%) 
21  
(0.2%) 
12  
(0.1%) 
53 
(0.2%) 
2.2 RET 26 
(13.7%) 
584 
(18.0%) 
1,544  
(13.6%) 
1,479  
(11.8%) 
3,634 
(13.3%) 
2.3 LINK 115 
(60.5%) 
1,252 
(38.6%) 
4,569  
(40.1%) 
4,773  
(38.2%) 
10,725 
(39.2%) 
2.4 CS 6  
(3.2%) 
182 
(5.6%) 
657  
(5.8%) 
805  
(6.4%) 
1,651 
(6.0%) 
Subtotal 147 
(77.4%) 
2,038 
(62.9%) 
6,791  
(59.6%) 
7,069  
(56.6%) 
16,063 
(58.8%) 
      
3.0 ES 4  
(2.1%) 
105 
(3.2%) 
546  
(4.8%) 
540  
(4.3%) 
1,195 
(4.4%) 
4.0 O 9  
(4.7%) 
305 
(9.4%) 
944  
(8.3%) 
978  
(7.8%) 
2,237 
(8.2%) 
5.0 ARB 35 
(18.4%) 
539 
(16.6%) 
735  
(6.5%) 
1,043  
(8.3%) 
2,358 
(8.6%) 
      
Total 
Category 
Hits 
295 
(100%) 
4,939 
(100%) 
17,819 
(100%) 
19,757 
(100%) 
42,844 
(100%) 
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Table 7 displays the results of the automatic content analysis.  As in the 
manual annotation, IS remains the most popular category, with 49% of 
patterns matched belonging to that major category.  Yet the emergence of 
CICTA as a major subcategory during the Outbreak stage and its 
persistence throughout the crisis is notable.  CICTA rose from 6.4% to 
16.2% during the Outbreak stage, and increased even more as tweets 
informed Egyptians on how to gain Internet access, avoid police, or even 
treat wounds.  The percentage of DEMO and REQ tweets remained 
approximately the same throughout the crisis. 
 Yet according to the automatic content analysis, the CTA category 
was also very popular.  This is largely due to the dominance of the LINK 
category, as it contains any patterns with an “http://” link as well as 
articles, photos, and videos of the protests that were not broadcast by 
Egyptian state television. DIR patterns consistently composed less than 
1% of their respective stages.  The RET category experienced a peak 
during the Outbreak stage with 11.8% of the total patterns, yet returned to 
approximately 8-9% during both Chronic stages.  Many of the RET tweets 
from the Chronic (Blackout) stage call for mass distribution of information 
to raise awareness of Egypt’s blackout policy.  However, Egyptians 
requesting Internet actions in the Post-Blackout Chronic stage likely 
replaced these.  One popular RET during the post-blackout stage was 
regarding a journalist who had been arrested, and the hash-tag #freeayman 
was used to increase external pressure on the security forces. Mr. Ayman 
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was freed shortly after.  The RET category provided a channel through 
which quick and easy interactive international action in support of the 
protesters could be taken. 
 The ES remained fairly low, though it reached its peak at 3.1% 
during the blackout. People outside of Egypt saw the extreme measures 
taken by Mubarak and wanted to offer support for the protesters.  Opinion 
patterns peaked during the Outbreak stage at 6.2%, when Twitter users 
were excited about the possibility of Egyptian protests. Having just seen 
the success of the Tunisian crisis, Twitter users optimistically expressed 
their personal views on the emerging crisis in Egypt.   
 Relevant Arabic tweets provide some of the most interesting 
information for the use of Twitter by Egyptians.  During the Prodrome, 
11.9% of tweets contained relevant Arabic patterns, reflective of the 
hangover from the Tunisian case, and interest in planned Egyptian protests 
on January 25.  In the Outbreak stage, the percentage of Arabic patterns 
dropped slightly to 10.9%, as non-Arabic speakers took notice of the 
massive mobilizations in Egypt.  During the blackout, relevant Arabic 
patterns drop precipitously, to 4.1%.  While still able to communicate, the 
blackout policy was largely effective in muting the reports from Egypt.  In 
the wake of the blackout, the percentage of ARB patterns rose to 5.3%, 
still much lower than its peak.  This perhaps represents the maturation of 
the uprising, from one primarily mobilized and organized online to one 
primarily actualized in the streets.   
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 It is important to note that the IR category (Table 8) was calculated 
in a slightly different way to accommodate the data.  In the case of the 
automatic content analysis, the IR tweets were counted as those not 
matched by the program.  In the Prodrome, 190 of the 313 were matched, 
leaving 123 as IR.  In the Outbreak stage, 3,240 of 4,534 were matched, 
resulting in 1,294 IR tweets.  The Chronic (Blackout) stage contained 
4,549 IR tweets, and the Post-Blackout stage contained 4,330.  This left a 
total of 10,296 IR tweets, equivalent to 27.3% of the total dataset.  This 
suggests the impact of the revolution on Twitter, given that the percentage 
of tweets related to the Egyptian unrest declines sharply after the Prodome 
stage.  This is logical given that the crisis had not yet begun, and few 
international English-speaking Twitter users were discussing the 
upcoming events. 
 
Table 8 – IR/Unmatched Tweets, according to the Automatic Content 
Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
C
r 
 
Critical Information Sharing and the Egyptian Revolution 
 
Despite the accuracy and overall detection problems regarding the 
Automatic Content Analysis program, the results of this paper’s research 
is useful in determining the use of Twitter during the Egyptian revolution.  
The prevalence of Information sharing is notable.  This implies that 
 Prodrome Outbreak Chronic 
(Blackout) 
Chronic (Post-
Blackout) 
Total 
6.0 IR/Not 
Matched 
123 
(39%) 
1,294 
(28.5%) 
4,549  
(28.5%) 
4,330  
(25.7%) 
10,296 
(27.3%) 
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Twitter was not primarily a tool for mobilization, but rather one for 
spreading information, both general and critical, to protesters and outside 
observers.  The spreading of information is a vital component to any 
revolutionary movement.  Considering that the government felt the need to 
shut down the Internet to hurriedly silence communication between 
protesters and the NPS, the effectiveness of Twitter and other OSM as 
tools for political change is clear.  Without information, there would be no 
way for protesters to know where to go, find updates on the progress of 
the program, or even understand their level of personal safety.  As Fathya 
Eldakhakhny explained, residents of Cairo were unsure of what was 
happening just outside of their houses (Eldakhakhny 4/15/2012).  The 
national news was ignoring the movement, repeating the message of 
stability.  Yet the people observed increasing chaos and instability.  The 
revolution, which began as little more than a gathering of disenfranchised 
and educated youths to express complaints about police corruption and 
advocate for democratic reform in the aftermath of Tunisia’s success, 
gained support once the demonstrations had a visible impact on 
government decision-making.  The Internet shutdown encouraged those 
who were in their homes trying to remain informed about the events in 
their own city, the “Sofa Party” according to Mervat Madkour to 
participate in the movement (Madkour 4/15/2012). 
 There is another side to information sharing, however.  Mubarak’s 
regime maintained tight control over traditional media outlets.  After the 
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protests became too large to ignore, the regime portrayed the 
demonstrators camped out in Tahrir Square as foreign dissidents or 
Iranians fomenting insurrection and instability.  ISPs and mobile phone 
service providers like Vodafone later claimed that their services had been 
co-opted by the government to send out misinformation about the 
nationality and intentions of the Tahrir protesters.  This was what 
encouraged pro-Mubarak protesters to enter Tahrir Square and attack the 
#Jan25 demonstrators.  Although this was just one use of NITs by the 
government to disrupt the revolution, the overwhelming majority of 
Twitter was part of the “consolidated generational opinion” cited by Han 
(2011) in his description of demonstration effects. 
 Given that information sharing was the most prevalent category of 
Twitter use and the information provided to protesters was the most 
directly relevant to the success of the protests, this paper considers the 
most important category for examination of the Twitter-created NPS 
during the revolution was that of Critical Information for Calls to Action.  
Early on in the movement, this critical information was focused on helping 
protesters know that location or time of planned demonstrations.  As 
January 25th wore on, however, the CICTA tweets shifted to providing 
information on updated locations as well as the police response.  Later in 
the day, instructions follow on how to prevent physical damage from tear 
gas.  The next series of tweets, beginning on January 27th, that serve as 
critical information sharing are regarding the lack of Internet access.  
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Some tweets report minor service outages, but as the transition to the 
Chronic (Blackout) stage begins, a huge number of tweets report major 
outages and indeed a near-complete shutdown.  The one ISP that 
maintained service for most of the blackout was Noor, left alone largely 
due to its connections to the Egyptian stock market.  Yet even leaving this 
one connection open served to undermine the blackout policy. Tweets at 
the beginning of the blackout allowed individual Noor customers to share 
or unlock their Internet service to allow public use.  When the co-opting of 
Noor’s service was no longer an option, international companies had 
developed strategies for providing service to protesters.  CICTA tweets at 
this time gave satellite phone numbers or ways to relay information 
through Twitter by leaving a phone message, bypassing the need for an 
Internet connection at all.  After Internet service was restored on February 
2, critical information focused primarily on the safety of protesters in 
Tahrir Square, sending out the location of major street battles and 
dissidents arrested.  The leaderless nature of the movement caused 
Mubarak’s regime to arrest bloggers and activists, including Wael Ghonim 
of We Are All Khaled Said.  Throughout the revolution, the CICTA 
category underscores the decentralized nature and importance of the 
networked public sphere.  Further revisions of the Automatic Content 
Analysis program hope to more accurately and fully illuminate each 
category of tweets. Given the CICTA category’s importance to the 
analysis, it was appropriate for this paper to analyze this category.  
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Examinations of each individual category will serve to provide more 
comprehensive information about the NPS, yet also require a more 
detailed and accurate data-gathering method to understand and properly 
interpret.   
 
Conclusion 
The increasing availability of large datasets and the capabilities to capture 
additional datasets have great potential for advancing humanities’ 
understanding on the nature of NIT-created (NPS) which will have 
dynamic effects on both democracy and our society in general.  
Recognizing the importance of the NPS, the National Science Foundation 
is soliciting a research proposal on how this NPS can enhance teaching 
and learning programs in our K-12 educational system, which includes 
improving student learning and engagement; optimizing personalized 
instruction; and supporting adaptive, rapid decision-making. As clearly 
expressed in NSF’s solicitation, it requires multidisciplinary efforts of the 
consilience from pure science to humanities.  This paper is an effort to 
combine a political inquiry on the unprecedented success of the young 
generation’s political mobilization with empirical evidence on the Arabic 
youth’s use of online social media and Twitter through an Automatic 
Content Analysis technique.  Though manual annotation of a randomly 
selected and representative sample can provide insight into the use of 
Twitter, this paper believes that the development of a large NLP program 
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that is capable of identifying and categorizing tweets from various datasets 
can lead to a simpler and more efficient study of the Twitter-created NPS. 
 This paper presents a series of research results attempting to 
explain the various uses of the Twitter-created NPS during the Egyptian 
revolution in 2011.  It is clear that the underlying sources of revolutionary 
fervor initially came from the policies of Mubarak and his failure to 
address the individual needs of ordinary Egyptians.  Given Mubarak’s 
emphasis on technological infrastructure for the purposes of economic 
development, the emergence of an active young NIT-savvy generation 
provided the mechanisms for mobilization.  The Twitter revolutions in 
Moldova and Iran in 2009, as well as the 2011 Tunisian revolution, 
provided demonstration effects that inspired Egyptians to use the Internet 
as a tool against the regime.  However, there is another side to NIT 
development. An increased infrastructure also provides oppressive 
regimes with more invasive tactics and intelligence with which they can 
consolidate and reinforce power. 
 This paper then establishes an analytical strategy to understand the 
use of Twitter during the crisis.  Finding relevant tweets from the NIST 
Tweets2011 archive, it used manual annotation to develop categories that 
could identify the various uses through the extraction of patterns within 
the tweets’ content.  The inaccuracy of the program, due to both the 
concept of personal expression, limited translation capabilities, and 
difficulty in acquiring specific data regarding multiple-category tweets, 
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led this paper to compare the results of the manual annotation to the 
automatic content analysis.   
 It is clear from both sets of results that Information Sharing (IS) is 
a dominant function of the Twitter-created NPS.  The variety of 
information sharing includes general information, critical information for 
calls to action, demonstration effects, and requests for information. The 
DEMO subcategory suggests that the Egyptian movement was related to 
the Tunisian Revolution less than one month earlier, and also had a 
profound effect on other Arab Spring movements.  The second most 
prevalent category was Call to Action (CTA), which consisted of tweets 
that urged the reader to perform a specific action.  This was mainly due to 
the calls for Internet action, either interactive (represented by the Retweet 
(RET) category), or inherently one-sided (represented by the Link to 
articles, photos, or videos (LINK) category).  The fluctuations of Arabic 
tweets indicates the effectiveness of Mubarak’s Internet blackout policy, 
though it was unsustainable and led to economic failures and the 
consolidation of international support against his regime.  Additionally, 
the decentralized nature of the NPS allowed some Egyptians to bypass the 
blackout, continuing to inform outsiders of the events in the country.  Yet 
this decentralization also highlights the fact that the revolution brought 
together a variety of groups with a variety of goals.  In Tahrir Square, the 
only common element among many the protesters was a desire to oust 
Mubarak.  Some demonstrators were more Islamic-oriented, and others 
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were explicitly secular.  Future studies of this dataset can try to take into 
account the sentiment and goals of Twitter users.  Though the process for 
analyzing massive quantities of data created by NITs can undoubtedly be 
improved, this paper serves as a template for future studies wishing to 
examine the use of Twitter in a particular case.   
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Honors Capstone Summary 
 
The Egyptian Revolution in 2011 that ousted Hosni Mubarak from power 
represented a shift in the foundations of revolutionary politics. After 
having ruled Egypt for nearly 30 years, Mubarak resigned after18 days of 
popular protests, lasting from January 25 to February 11, 2011. The 
movement was decentralized, and crowds emerged quickly in various 
places according to the protesters’ use of online social media (OSM) such 
as Faebook, Youtube, and Twitter over the networked public sphere 
(NPS). The NPS is a web of connections composed of technologies such 
as cell phones and the Internet, as well as OSM. The government was 
unable to respond competently to the threat posed by Internet use, at one 
point even shutting off the country’s Internet connection in a futile effort 
to quell the protesters. While the Western media was quick to label the 
uprising as another “Twitter Revolution,” as they had in 2009 with Iran 
and Moldova, and earlier in the Arab Spring with Tunisia, little empirical 
evidence exists to support this claim. This paper hopes to provide some 
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insight into the use of Twitter during this political crisis, and does so by 
downloading and analyzing 37,613 tweets sent during the revolution. This 
led to several major questions: What roles did Twitter play in the 
revolution? What kinds of information were shared during this time? What 
kinds of actions were called for? Can evidence of the demonstration effect 
(which will be explained later) be found in the tweets sent? Is Twitter 
largely an interactive or non-interactive form of communication? How did 
Twitter use change during different stages of the revolution? Finally, what 
effects, if any, did Mubarak’s total Internet shutdown have on the use of 
Twitter during the revolution that brought down his regime? 
 The first section of the paper discusses the variety of factors that 
contributed to the uprising in Egypt in order to properly contextualize the 
role of OSM and the NPS. Demographically, the emergence of a large 
young generation played an important role. The median age in Egypt, a 
country of 80 million people, is 24.3. 61% of the population is younger 
than 40. These people had grown up entirely under Mubarak’s rule, and 
were not satisfied by the results of his policies after 30 years. Life politics 
(an idea put forward by Anthony Giddens in 1991) is the notion that 
political movements are no longer defined primarily by charismatic 
figures and anti-colonialist sentiment, but rather issues affecting the 
everyday lives of citizens. Mubarak’s regime struggled with many of these 
“life politics” categories, with inflation at 11% (from 2010-2011), a 24% 
unemployment rate among youths, a GDP of $6,200, and a score of 3.8 on 
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Transparency International’s “Perceived Corruption Index” (scaled from 
1-10 with 10 being the least corrupt). One factor in which Egypt was 
improving dramatically was the literacy rate. The overall literacy rate 
among Egyptians is 66%, yet among youths this jumps to 82% for females 
and 88% for males. While indicating an increased capacity for education, 
this figure does not take into account the inequality in educational 
services. Many young Egyptians, often in rural areas, remained 
uneducated, a segment of the young generation arose that was capable of 
understanding and communicating their complaints in a coherent fashion. 
This was the critical group that initiated the demonstrations during January 
and February 2011. The young generation at the center of the protest 
movements were also technologically literate, developing relationships 
with the virtual networked public sphere that they could not with the 
physical public sphere. The initial protests were, to some extent, 
mobilized, organized, and expedited by OSM, and that the actualization of 
these protests on the ground encouraged normally inactive citizens to 
participate in a drive for political change. In looking at the role of Twitter 
in the demonstrations, it was difficult to develop an effective analytical 
strategy due to the relative youth of the technology. We decided to use 
Han’s (2012) strategy of Automatic Content Analysis, as will be described 
later.   
 In order to make Han’s analysis feasible and relevant, obtaining a 
detailed chronology was important to set understand the nature of Twitter 
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use. The revolution was divided according to Fisk’s Four Stages of 
Political Crises: Prodrome, Outbreak, Chronic, and Resolution. In the 
prodrome stage, events and sentiments build toward a breaking point. 
Egypt’s prodrome was marked by smaller protests and the emergence of 
an online presence unafraid to discuss blatant police corruption, 
unemployment, or the Tunisian Revolution of 2011 that ousted another 
presumably established Arab leader. The prodromal problems culminated 
in an Outbreak, or major event that sparked the political crisis. In Egypt, 
the January 25 protests were the first major protests, called for online and 
realized in the streets. The protests persisted, with misinformation and 
confusion prevalent among the Egyptian population. The Chronic stage 
began on January 28, when Mubarak made the decision to cut off the 
Internet, hoping to silence communication between protesters. Ironically, 
this policy actually brought more Egyptians to the streets, as they no 
longer had computers to use. The shutdown was also ineffective because it 
damaged the Egyptian economy while encouraging the decentralized 
networked public sphere to find new and uncontrollable ways to share and 
receive information. International media providers voluntarily worked 
with Egyptians to improve service, with Google even enabling 
Speak2Tweet technology that allowed people to send out messages by 
leaving a voicemail. The flexibility of Twitter as a communication tool is 
another reason to analyze the content of the data sent. Violence broke out 
after the shutdown was lifted, marking the beginning of a Chronic (Post-
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Blackout) stage, which is used for the analysis later. While the violence 
subsided, the crowds were still present in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and many 
other locations, leading to Mubarak’s resignation (the Resolution stage) on 
February 11.  
 In order to perform the aforementioned Automatic Content 
Analysis, Professor Han, myself, and graduate student Dong-yoon Han 
downloaded the National Institute of Statistics’ Tweets2011 Archive, 
containing 16 million tweets collected between January 23 and February 
8, 2011. Dong-yoon Han downloaded the tweets and began creating a 
program that could conduct the analysis that would correctly interpret this 
huge number of tweets. Of the 37,613-tweet database we found to contain 
hash tags related to the revolution, a random sample was taken from each 
stage represented in the archive (Prodrome, Outbreak, Chronic (Blackout), 
and Chronic (Post-Blackout)). These samples were manually annotated to 
create general categories that could be identified by key patterns or 
phrases in a computer program. These categories included, for example, 
Information Sharing (IS), Call to Action (CTA), Expression of Support 
(ES), and Opinion (O). Each of these categories was related to a series of 
key patterns that the Automatic Content Analysis program could identify 
and extract from the large tweet database, theoretically providing an 
accurate account of Twitter use during each stage. 
 Another benefit of the manual analysis is that the qualitative study 
of tweets is important, providing a nuanced and accurate analysis of that 
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small group of tweets. After all, Twitter is a form of personal expression, 
and, as was reinforced through this research, there are very few definitive 
categories related to individuality and personal expression. The most 
difficult aspect of creating an Automatic Content Analysis was developing 
an accurate program that identified and categorized a great number of 
tweets, and after several revisions, this still remains a problem. However, 
the error analysis strategy is slowly adding credibility to the program, and 
continued work will likely provide usable data and a framework for future 
Twitter research. 
 The tentative results as of the time of creating this Honors 
Capstone Project suggest that Information Sharing was the prominent use 
of Twitter throughout the revolution. Though calls for Internet activism 
were also prevalent, the primary purpose of Twitter during the political 
crisis was to inform readers. By providing general information, protesters 
could update those outside of Egypt on the events, and by providing 
critical information, protesters could learn of police tactics or new ways to 
circumvent the Internet blackout. 
 Though relatively raw, this type of research is incredibly important 
because as of now there are no standard methods for studying the massive 
quantities of data escaping from the networked public sphere. The 
technology is simply too new and the amount of data too great to deal with 
qualitatively (although this would be ideal due to the personal expression 
limitations mentioned above). By looking into the Egyptian revolution as a 
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case study, this paper hopes to increase awareness and strategies of 
Twitter researchers to benefit the future study of Twitter during political 
crises and other times.  
 
